Rape as a weapon of war? - A critical legal analysis of the definition of rape and the concept of rape as a weapon of war by Lundgren, Sofia
  
FACULTY OF LAW 
Lund University 
 
Sofia Lundgren 
 
Rape as a weapon of war? 
A critical legal analysis of the definition of rape and the 
concept of rape as a weapon of war 
 
 
 
LAGF03 Bachelor Thesis 
 
Bachelor Thesis, Master of Laws program 
15 higher education credits 
 
Supervisor: Peter Gottschalk 
 
Semester: Spring term 2015 
Contents 
SUMMARY 1 
SAMMANFATTNING 2 
ABBREVIATIONS 3 
1 INTRODUCTION 4 
1.1 Purpose 4 
1.2 Research questions and delimitations 5 
1.3 Methodology and materials 6 
1.4 Research status 6 
1.5 Structrure 7 
2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 8 
2.1 Social and cultural dynamics 8 
3 TRIBUNALS AND COURTS 10 
3.1 ICTY 10 
3.2 ICTR 10 
3.3 ICC 11 
4 THE CRIMES 13 
4.1 Crimes against humanity 13 
4.2 Genocide 15 
4.3 Rape as a weapon of war or genocide 18 
5 THE DEFINITION OF RAPE 20 
5.1 Consent 23 
5.2 The legal discourse 25 
6 CONCLUSION 27 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 29 
 
 1 
Summary 
Systematic rape of women in wartime is an ancient issue. For centuries, rape 
was seen as an inevitable by-product of war and it is not until recently that 
the international community has recognized rape as a weapon of war. There 
are several reasons for the systematic use of rape in times of conflict and 
this thesis will provide some of the most generally received theories.  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have made the most 
important advances regarding wartime rape. The tribunals were the first 
international criminal tribunals that explicitly recognized rape as a crime 
against humanity. The ICTR also acknowledged that rape could constitute 
an act of genocide. The thesis will give a comprehensive analysis of the 
requirements necessary for rape to be prosecuted as a crime against 
humanity or genocide. The recognition of rape as a weapon of war have 
been significant for the visibility of wartime rape, however, the concept may 
have had some unintended consequences. The concept may exclude some 
victims from the justice system and draw focus from the individual act of 
rape.   
 
ICTY and ICTR have also developed different definitions of rape 
throughout its jurisprudence. The most received definition requires proof of 
non-consent or coercive circumstances for a successful conviction. The 
question of non-consent have been a subject for discussion among legal 
scholars and differences have arisen. This thesis will compare and analyse 
the definitions developed by the ad hoc Tribunals and the question of non-
consent will be given further attention.  
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Sammanfattning 
Systematiska våldtäkter av kvinnor i krigstider är inget nytt problem. 
Genom århundraderna har våldtäkt ansetts vara en oundviklig konsekvens 
av krigföring och det är inte förrän relativt nyligen som det internationella 
samfundet har erkänt att våldtäkt kan fungera som ett stridsmedel. Teorierna 
om den systematiska användningen av våldtäkt är många och denna uppsats 
ska föra fram några av de vanligaste förställningarna om varför våldtäkt i 
många fall används som en medveten stridsmetod.  
 
Den Internationella Krigsförbrytartribunalen för det Forna Jugoslavien 
(ICTY) och den Internationella Krigsförbrytartribunalen för Rwanda (ICTR) 
har gjort stora framsteg när det gäller erkännandet av våldtäkt som 
stridsmedel. Tribunalerna var de första internationella 
krigsförbrytartribunalerna som uttryckligen konstaterade att våldtäkt kan 
utgöra ett brott mot mänskligheten och ICTR har även bekräftat att våldtäkt 
kan utgöra folkmord. Denna uppsats ska ge en genomgripande analys av 
rekvisiten för att våldtäkt ska kunna utgöra brott mot mänskligheten och 
folkmord. Erkännandet av våldtäkt som stridsmedel har varit betydande för 
uppmärksamheten av de storskaliga och systematiska kränkningar som 
många kvinnor i utsätts för krig. Emellertid kan konceptet av våldtäkt som 
stridsmedel få oavsiktliga konsekvenser. Det kan leda till att våldtäktsoffer 
exkluderas från definitionen eller så kan det avleda uppmärksamhet från den 
individuella våldtäkten.   
 
ICTY och ICTR har genom sin praxis utvecklat ett antal olika definitioner 
av våldtäkt. Den mest erkända definitionen förutsätter att offret inte 
samtyckt till samlaget eller att det förelåg tvingande omständigheter. Frågan 
om samtycke har lett till en livlig diskurs bland folkrättsjurister och 
meningsskiljaktigheter har uppstått. I denna uppsats kommer de olika 
definitionerna att jämföras och analyseras samt att frågan om samtycke 
kommer att utredas ytterligare.  
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Abbreviations  
ICC International Criminal Court  
ICC Statute Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTR Statute Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia 
ICTY Statute  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia  
UN United Nations 
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1 Introduction  
Systematic use of rape in times of conflict is an ancient issue and legal 
scholars have debated the subject for centuries. Even though the problem 
has been visible for a long time, it is not until recently the subject have been 
properly addressed in international law. The topic is very complex and 
requires an interdisciplinary approach for a comprehensive analysis. To 
achieve this it is necessary to create further academic discussions, 
researches and analyses regarding the topic. Even though substantial 
progress has been made in the last decades, many challenges remains. This 
thesis will focus on the definition of rape in international law, the concept of 
rape as a weapon of war and how rape can be prosecuted as a crime against 
humanity and genocide.  
 
1.1 Purpose  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the definition of rape under 
international law has developed throughout the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
Tribunals. The thesis will also deal with the concept of rape as a weapon of 
war and the possibilities of prosecuting systematic rapes towards women in 
international courts and tribunals. The main purpose is to provide a legal 
analysis of the definition of rape and investigate how rape ought to be 
defined in international law. If possible, the thesis will provide some 
recommendations of how the definition could be improved. The thesis will 
also attempt to reveal the complexity of the subject and the unwanted 
consequences an inadequate definition could have.   
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1.2 Research questions and delimitations  
This thesis will be limited to the analysis of female rape as a crime against 
humanity or genocide and the focus will be on the jurisprudence of ICTY 
and ICTR.  
 
Due to space limitations, this thesis will not deal with other gender-based 
crimes such as; sexual violence, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, 
forced marriage and sexual slavery. Neither will this thesis deal with the 
complex issue of rape and sexual violence against male victims, which 
should be addressed separately for a comprehensive analysis. The focus will 
be on the jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR, since these two tribunals 
have made the most significant progress when prosecuting rape as genocide 
or a crime against humanity, and in finding an adequate definition of rape.  
 
The thesis will not deal with rape as a war crime due to the fact that most 
discourses related to the topic of this thesis regards rape committed as 
genocide or crimes against humanity. “Rape as a weapon of war” it is often 
used “widespread or systematic” or as a part of ethnic cleansing, which is 
why the thesis will focus on genocide and crimes against humanity.  Neither 
will the thesis address the complex issue of the definition of armed conflict. 
 
This thesis will attempt to answer the following research questions;  
 How should rape be defined in international law for the definition to 
include as many cases as possible without neglecting the rule of law 
or the sexual autonomy? 
 How have the concept of “rape as a weapon of war” affected the 
judicial situation for women?   
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1.3 Methodology and materials 
In the research and writing of this thesis, I will use the traditional legal 
method to explore and interpret case law from the ICTR and the ICTY. I 
shall also use the traditional legal method to interpret and compare 
international statutes and conventions.  Together with the traditional legal 
method, I will use critical legal methodology to determine the consequences 
of today’s definition of rape and the concept of “rape as a weapon of war”. I 
shall also use a critical approach in my attempt to find the sources to the 
frequent use of rape in armed conflict, as well as in my endeavour to find an 
adequate definition of wartime rape. These methods will be used together 
with a gender-oriented perspective, since the issue is gender-related. The 
gender-oriented perspective will be used when examining and comparing 
the jurisprudence from the ad hoc Tribunals, as well as when analysing 
different theories from legal scholars. I shall also put a gender-oriented 
perspective to the question of how rape ought to be defined and how the 
concept of “rape as a weapon of war” affects women’s legal situation.  
 
I will rely mostly on case law from the ICTY and ICTR, together with 
academic writing from legal scholars. In addition to this, I will use various 
international legal instruments such as; statutes and documents from 
international courts and tribunals, international conventions, UN Security 
Council Resolutions and UN reports.   
1.4 Research status  
The use of wartime rape is a wide and controversial subject. Several legal 
scholars have written about the subject over the years and numerous 
different angles of the problem have been viewed. Since the 1970s, legal 
feminists have made significant effort to get wartime rape recognized by the 
international community. The jurisprudential achievements made by the 
ICTY and the ICTR have been both applauded and criticized, and legal 
scholars constantly debate the question of non-consent as an element of 
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rape. A shift in paradigm has been visible the last decade and the 
undesirable consequences of an extensive definition of rape and high 
visibility of the concept of rape as weapon of war have been discussed. The 
most recent debate has also been more gender-neutral and the strict focus on 
female rape has been criticized.  
1.5 Structrure  
The second chapter of this thesis will give a short historical background to 
the use of wartime rape together with some theories about why rape is used 
as a weapon of war. The third chapter will give a brief presentation of the 
tribunals and courts that this thesis focuses on. The fourth chapter describes 
the elements required for rape to constitute genocide or a crime against 
humanity and the concept of “rape as a weapon of war”. In the fifth chapter, 
the definition of rape in international law is examined throughout a case 
study of the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR. The chapter deals with 
the actus reus and the mens rea of the crime, together with the question of 
non-consent. Chapter six will provide conclusions and a further analysis.  
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2 Historical background  
For a long time, rape was socially accepted within the rules of warfare. 
Women were property of men and the conquered women were seen as spoils 
of warfare, belonging to the victor.  Rape was an inevitable by-product of 
war.
1
 Even though rape has been prohibited in warfare throughout history, 
international recognition and understanding of the crime did not emerge 
until after World War II.
2
   
 
Countless acts of rape, mostly towards women and children, in Bosnia and 
Rwanda took the international community by surprise. This became a 
turning point for the recognition of rape as a weapon of war, as new codes 
of law were established, along with new legal institutions to uphold them. 
The first steps towards advancing international justice for rape as a weapon 
of war were made.
3
  
 
 
2.1 Social and cultural dynamics  
Armed conflicts have existed since the existence of mankind and rape has 
been its constant shadow. Rape has appeared both opportunistically and 
strategically with women and girls as main targets. The violence against 
                                               
1 Askin, Kelly: “Treatment of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: A Historical 
Perspective and the Way Forward”. In: de Brouwer, Anne-Marie; Ku, Charlotte; Römkens, 
Renée; van den Herik, Larissa (eds.): Sexual Violence as an International Crime: 
Interdisciplinary Approaches, Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland, Intersentia Publishing Ltd, 
2013, p. 20.  
2 Ellis, Mark: Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, Issue 2 (2006-2007), p. 227.  
3 de Brouwer, Anne-Marie; Ku, Charlotte; Römkens, Renée; van den Herik, Larissa: 
“Interdisciplinary Approaches to Recognizing, Investigating and Prosecuting Sexual 
Violence as an International Crime”. In: de Brouwer, Anne-Marie; Ku, Charlotte; 
Römkens, Renée; van den Herik, Larissa (eds.): Sexual Violence as an International Crime: 
Interdisciplinary Approaches, Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland, Intersentia Publishing Ltd, 
2013, p. 3.  
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women has increased during the last century and in many conflicts, women 
and girls are primary targets.
4
  
 
The usual conception about rape is that it is about power and dominance 
between the sexes and these dynamics are equally applicable in time of 
conflict.
5
  Rape works as a mechanism of terror to control the woman, and it 
is an expression for women’s subordinate social status. The sexual abuse 
symbolizes masculinity, sexual power and male supremacy.
6
 When 
traditional male power dynamics are imbalanced, as in time of conflict, it is 
common that the number of rapes increases. It is as an instrument to 
maintain and restore the power balances in society and to suppress the 
challenges to the dominant group’s social status.7  
 
Female rape can be a symbol of men’s failure in protecting “their” women. 
When female members of the family are raped, it is humiliating to the 
family and to the community.
8
  Female bodies are used to disempower and 
emasculate the men and public rapes are used to achieve maximum 
humiliation.
9
 Complex emotions of hate, vengeance and superiority towards 
the other side of the conflict can be expressed throughout rape of the 
enemy’s women.10  
 
  
                                               
4 Askin, p. 19 
5 Sivakumaran, Sandesh: Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict, The European 
Journal of International Law,  Vol 18 no. 2, 2007, p. 267.  
6 McKinnon, Catharine: Reflections on Sex Equality under Law, The Yale Law Journal, 
Vol. 100, No. 5, Centennial Issue, 1991, p. 328.  
7 Sivakumaran,, p. 267.  
8 Chinkin, Christine: Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, Issue 3, 1994, p. 328.  
9 Sivakumaran, p. 268.  
10 Chinkin, p. 328.  
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3 Tribunals and Courts  
3.1 ICTY 
The conflict in the Former Yugoslavia was brutal, and rape was used as a 
systematic weapon to destroy the cultural fabric of the Muslim population.
11
 
The ICTY was established in 1992 by the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council throughout resolution 827. ICTY was established to put an end to 
the horrendous crimes and to prosecute those responsible for them.
12
 The 
Tribunal has jurisdiction over grave beaches of the Geneva Conventions
13
, 
other war crimes
14
, crimes against humanity
15
 and genocide
16
 committed in 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991
17
. Rape is specifically mentioned as an 
act that can constitute a crime against humanity in the ICTY Statute.
18
 
 
3.2 ICTR 
During the genocide in Rwanda, rapes appeared on a massive scale. The 
number of rapes committed against women in Rwanda during the genocide 
has been estimated to between 250 000 and 500 000.
19
 Rape was used as a 
weapon, “it was the rule and its absence was the exception”20. Rape was 
                                               
11
 Ellis pp. 225-226.  
12 United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993. 
13 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute), 
Article 2. 
14 ICTY Statute, Article 3. 
15 ICTY Statute, Article 5.  
16 ICTY Statute, Article 4. 
17 ICTY Statute, Article 1.  
18 ICTY Statute, Article 5(g) 
19 Bianchi, Linda: “The Prosecution of Rape and Sexual Violence: Lessons from 
Prosecutions at the ICTR”. In: de Brouwer, Anne-Marie; Ku, Charlotte; Römkens, Renée; 
van den Herik, Larissa (eds.): Sexual Violence as an International Crime: Interdisciplinary 
Approaches, Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland, Intersentia Publishing Ltd, 2013, p. 126.  
20 Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. René Degni-Ségui, 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of resolution 
S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68, para. 16, (Degni Report) access April 13, 
2015, available at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G96/104/66/PDF/G9610466.pdf?OpenElement. 
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used as a weapon and women of all ages were raped, no mercy was shown.
21
 
Most of the targeted women were Tutsi, who were targeted because of 
ethnicity and gender and most rapes took place in public. Some Hutu 
women were also raped because they were married to Tutsi men or had 
protected Tutsi. Several victims had to witness their families being tortured 
and murdered before being raped.
22
  
 
ICTR was established in 1994 by the Security Council in resolution 955. 
The purpose of the Tribunal was to face the serious crimes committed in 
Rwanda during the internal conflict in 1994.
23
 The Tribunal has jurisdiction 
over the crime of genocide
24
, crimes against humanity
25
 and some war 
crimes
26
 committed in Rwanda during 1994.
27
 
3.3 ICC 
The ICC is a permanent, independent and treaty based international criminal 
court with its seat in Hague, the Netherlands. The court was created in 1998 
when 120 states adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC Statute) and its purpose is to prosecute perpetrators of the most 
serious international crimes. The ICC Statute entered in to force in 2002 
when it had reached the required 60 ratifications. 
28
 
 
In the ICC Statute, rape is expressly mentioned as an act that can constitute 
crimes against humanity
29
 and war crimes
30
. The Court has codified many 
of the judgements of the ICTY and ICTR and made important advancement 
in recognizing rape as one of the most serious crimes under international 
                                               
21 Degni Report, para. 16-19.  
22 Bianchi,  p. 126. 
23 UN Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994. 
24 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute), Article 2. 
25 ICTR Statute, Article 3. 
26 ICTR Statute, Article 4.  
27 ICTR Statute, Article 1.  
28 About the Court, International Criminal Court, access May 19, 2015, available at: 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx.  
29 ICC Statute, Article 7(1)(g). 
30 ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii).  
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law.
31
 The Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and aggression.
32
  
  
                                               
31 Ellis, p. 238.  
32 ICC Statute, Article 5.  
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4 The crimes  
This thesis will focus on crimes against humanity and genocide since the 
concept of “rape as a weapon of war” often is connected to these two 
crimes.  The chapter will provide the requirements for systematic rape to be 
punishable under international law.  
4.1 Crimes against humanity   
Rape is generally a domestic crime, but when it appears in a certain context, 
it becomes an international crime.  The definition of this context has varied 
over the years and the first definitions required the existence of an armed 
conflict. However, in latter definitions and in customary international law, 
the context requirements have changed.
33
 The ICTY Statute is an exception, 
since it requires that the acts are “committed in armed conflict”34. However, 
the ICTY has admitted that the requirement of a nexus to an armed conflict 
is no longer required by customary international law.
35
 This thesis will focus 
on the definition existing under customary international and in the statutes 
of the ICC and ICTR. The definition enacts that the conduct has to occur in 
the context of a widespread and systematic attack against a civil 
population.
36
 
 
The crime is very complex and it consists of a conduct, contextual elements 
and mental elements. In this thesis, the relevant criminal conduct is rape and 
the conduct has to fulfil the elements required for the crime of rape. The 
definition of rape will be further analysed in the next chapter. For a criminal 
conduct to be classified as a crime against humanity it is also necessary to 
have mental elements. The perpetrator has to fulfil the mental element of the 
                                               
33 Cryer, Robert: ”International Criminal Law”. In: Evans, Malcom (ed.), International 
Law, fourth edition, Oxford; New York,  Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 759-760.  
34 ICTY Statute, Article 5.  
35
ICTY, case IT-94-1-T, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Trail Chamber Judgment of 7 May 
1997, para. 627.  
36 ICTR Statute, Article 3 and ICC Statute, Article 7.  
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specific act (rape) as well as to be aware of the widespread and systematic 
context in which the act appeared. The contextual element involves a 
conduct that takes place within a widespread and systematic attack against a 
civil population.
37
  
 
In the Kunarac case, ICTY successfully convicted individuals accused of 
rape as a crime against humanity for the first time.
38
 The Appeals Chamber 
stated that; “the phrase “widespread” refers to the large-scale nature of the 
attack and the number of victims, while the phrase “systematic” refers to 
the organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their 
random occurrence”39. When similar criminal conducts are repeated and 
performed on a regular basis it can constitute proof of a systematic attack.
40
  
This definition has been established by the ad hoc Tribunals in several cases 
and it is universally applicable.
41
   
 
It is not the rapes per se that has to be widespread or systematic but the 
rapes have to appear in the context of a widespread or systematic attack 
against civilians. In the Gacumbitsi case the rapes against female Tutsi 
occurred in an area where Tutsi were subjected to a widespread and 
systematic attack because of their ethnicity. The Appeals Chamber 
concluded that the rapes of Tutsi women were part of the widespread and 
systematic attack against the Tutsi population.
42
  
 
In the Brđanin case the Tribunal was convinced that the rapes were 
connected to the armed conflict and a part of the widespread and systematic 
attack against the Muslim population in the area. The arguments about the 
rapes committed being “individual domestic crimes” was dismissed by the 
                                               
37 Cryer, pp. 759-761. 
38 Ellis, p. 229.  
39 ICTY, case, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23-1/A, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir 
Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 12 June 2002 (Kunarac Appeal 
Judgment), para. 94.  
40 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 94.  
41
 ICTR, case ICTR-2001-64-A, Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment of 7 July 2006 (Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment), para. 101. 
42 Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 102.  
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Tribunal. The Tribunal saw the rapes in a broader context and found the 
rapes being a part of the widespread and systematic attack against the 
Muslim population.
43
 
4.2 Genocide  
Genocide focuses on threats directed to the existence of a group.
44
 The 
internationally accepted definition of genocide derives from the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention). The crime is defined in Article 2 and prohibits 
attempts to destroy a group of people based on nationality, ethnicity, race or 
religion.
45
 According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), cultural 
destruction is not sufficient to constitute genocide; it has to be some kind of 
physical destruction. However, the Court noted that attacks on cultural and 
religious property or symbols often occur simultaneously with attempts to 
physically destroy a group.
46
 
 
The mental element is the factor that distinguishes genocide from “mere” 
mass killing and the mental element consists of the intent to destroy the 
targeted group.
47
 In the Jelesic case the Appeals Chamber concluded that 
personal motive was not required but direct intention was necessary. 
Indirect intent was insufficient.
48
 Due to the heavy burden of proof, 
genocidal intent is hard to prove.
49
 According to the ICTR, genocidal intent 
depends on circumstantial factors such as; overall context of the conduct, 
how victims are targeted, if the perpetrator have targeted the same group 
                                               
43 ICTY, case IT-99-36-A, Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 3 April 
2007, para. 256-257.  
44 Cryer, p. 755.  
45 Genocide Convention, Article 2.  
46 ICJ, Case concerning application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
the crime of genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 
February 2007 (Bosnian Genocide Case), para. 344.  
47 Cryer, p. 756.  
48
 ICTY, case No. IT-95-10-A, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelesic, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 
5 July 2001, para. 49-51.  
49 Cryer, pp. 756-757.  
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when committing other crimes and the scale, scope and frequency of the 
destructive acts.
50
  
 
Difficulties to define a protected group may occur. ICJ has stated that a 
group have to have some positive characteristics, like; national, religious, 
ethnic or racial. The Court rejected that a group can be defined negatively, 
like “all non-Serbs”. The group has to have a particular group identity. The 
targeted part of the group has to be substantial and the acts perpetrated 
towards them have to have an impact on the group as a whole.
51
 When 
deciding whether a victim belongs to a protected group, the main focus is 
the perpetrators subjective perceptions. It is sufficient that the perpetrator 
believes that the victim belong to the protected group and target the victim 
because of that.
52
 
 
Rape is not expressly mentioned in the Genocide Convention, nor is gender 
listed as a protected group. However, rape can implicitly be included in the 
following acts; “Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group”53 or “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group”54. According to jurisprudence from the ad hoc Tribunals, rape can 
still be a part of the destruction process since it inflicts both physical and 
psychological harm to the victim and the targeted group.
55
  
 
Public rape can work as an instrument to displace the ethnic group from the 
region as it spreads fear and humiliation throughout the community and may 
compel the group to flee. The same result can also be accomplished by 
                                               
50 ICTR, case No. ICTR-01-63-T, Prosecutor v. Siméon Nchamihigo, Trail Chamber 
Judgment of 12 November 2008, para. 331.   
51 Bosnian Genocide Case, para. 193.  
52 ICTR, case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Trail Chamber 
Judgment of 15 May 2003, para. 317.  
53
 Genocide Convention, Article 2(b).  
54 Genocide Convention, Article 2(d).  
55 Bianchi, p. 141.  
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forcing family members to rape each other. The targets are often young 
women, virgins and educated and prominent members of the community. 
56
 
 
Rape can be used to prevent births within the targeted group as it may 
damage the woman’s fertility.  The community may also see the raped 
women as undesirable or the rape may cause psychological damage to the 
woman and prevent her from procreating. In many societies the children’s 
identity is determined by the father’s ethnicity and the perpetrator may 
therefore deliberately impregnate the women with the intent that the child 
will belong to the father’s group.57 
 
The most important case concerning rape as part of genocide is the Akayesu 
case.  Rape was not initially included among the charges towards Akayesu. 
When witnesses spontaneously started to testify of acts of rape the ICTR 
decided to investigate the matter further. The female judge Navanethem 
Pially initiated the investigation.
58
 In the Akayesu case the Tribunal 
confirmed that Tutsi women were raped solely because they were Tutsi. 
Rape was used as a method to destroy the ethnic group, “destruction of the 
spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself”59.  ICTR found that the rapes 
committed constituted acts of genocide, in accordance to Article 2(2) of the 
ICTR Statute, since it inflicted serious bodily and mental harm to the 
victims. ICTR clarified that rape can constitute an act of genocide in the 
same way as any other act as long as the perpetrators intention is to destroy 
the targeted group. The tribunal also concluded that rape is one of the worst 
ways of inflicting harm to the victim, since the harm is both bodily and 
mental.
60
 
 
                                               
56 UN Secretary-General, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 of May 27 1994, para. 
250(a), access April 8, 2015, available at: 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf. 
57 ICTR, case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Trail Chamber 
Judgment of 2 September 1998 (Akayesu Trail Judgment), para 507-508.  
58
 Ellis, p. 233.  
59 Akayesu Trail Judgment, para. 732.  
60 Akayesu Trail Judgment, para. 731-734.  
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Female rape has not yet been included in a genocide conviction in ICTY.
61
 
 
4.3 Rape as a weapon of war or genocide  
Rape as a weapon of war is not a legal concept, but the term have developed 
legal significance by the work of ICTY and ICTR. The Tribunals have 
recognized rape as an instrumental component to armed conflict and not 
only a by-product.
62
 The UN Security Council has recognized that sexual 
violence (including rape) is used as a weapon of war in many conflicts.
63
 
 
Many legal feminist believes that the ad hoc Tribunals have not gone far 
enough in protecting women and their rights in wartime. During the Balkan 
war, two different camps among feminists emerged. One side saw the rapes 
committed being primary genocidal and focused on rapes towards Bosnian 
Muslim women. The other side wanted the international community to 
response equally to rapes committed on both sides of the conflict.
64
 The 
latter did not deny the genocidal aspects of the rapes committed against 
Bosnian Muslim women, but they would rather see that all rapes committed 
were considered genocidal because of how they affected women as a group. 
They wanted “women” to be a protected group for the crime of genocide. 65 
Both feminist camps described women as victims of war. Especially 
Bosnian Muslim women were seen as rape victims and were identified as 
“raped women”, “powerless” or “broken”.66   
 
According to Buss, the categorization of rape as a weapon of war has had 
some unintended consequences.
67
 When classifying rape as a weapon of war 
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or genocide the image of rape as an inevitable and natural part of armed 
conflict is preserved. This may result in the naturalization of rape as an 
always available weapon in armed conflict. Women are portrayed as raped 
or possible rape victims. When recognizing rape as a weapon of genocide in 
the conflict in Rwanda, the rapes perpetrated were derogated to “Hutu men 
raping Tutsi women”. Using the term “rape as a weapon of genocide” may 
exclude many women who were victims of rape from the justice system. 
Many women who suffered during the Rwandan genocide were not included 
in the term “Tutsi women” and were excluded from the international legal 
system. To put too much focus on the broader context and “rape as a 
weapon of war/genocide” may also draw attention from the individual act of 
rape.
68
  
 
In the Akayesu case, the ICTY declared that; “The rape of Tutsi women was 
systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi women and solely against 
them.”69 This conclusion made by the Tribunal disregards that other 
women, not solely Tutsi women, were victims of rape during the conflict. 
When derogating the definition to “rapes perpetrated by Hutu men towards 
Tutsi women” the full complexity of the usage of rape in the Rwandan 
genocide is not adequately reflected. To define the rapes committed solely 
as a weapon of genocide also leads away attention from the social, political 
and economic structures that were the source to the genocide.
70
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5 The definition of rape 
This thesis will focus on four different definitions of rape developed by the 
ICTR, ICTY and ICC.  
 
The first definition was developed by ICTR in the Akayesu case. The 
Tribunal declared that there was no commonly accepted definition of rape in 
international law and found the definition of rape as “non-consensual sexual 
intercourse”, not being suitable in the context of international law. The 
Tribunal found several similarities between rape and torture as they are both 
violations on personal dignity and intended to intimidate, humiliate, punish 
and control the population. Therefore the Tribunal found it suitable to use an 
approach similar to the one used for torture.
71
  
 
The term rape was defined as; “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive”72 The 
Tribunal also gave examples of coercive circumstances: “Threats, 
intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in 
certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of 
Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.”73 
 
The definition developed in the Akayesu case diverges from the traditional 
definition of rape adopted in domestic legal systems in two ways. It includes 
forced oral and anal sexual penetration as well as forced penetration with 
other body parts, such as fingers and tongue. The definition is also gender 
neutral. It is noteworthy that the Tribunal did not address the question of 
lack of consent or the mens rea of the crime.
74
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In the Furundžija case the ICTY discussed the definition developed in the 
Akayesu case but did not apply it. Instead the Tribunal concluded that the 
term rape was not clearly defined in international law and turned to the 
major legal systems of the world to find applicable principles of criminal 
law. After examining different legal system’s definition of rape, the 
Tribunal found this to be acceptable objective elements of rape
75
: “(i) the 
sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by 
the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;  
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third 
person.”76 
 
An important conclusion made in the Furundžija case was that coercion 
could be directed towards a third party and not exclusively towards the 
victim. The definition was made more explicit, and for the first time the 
Tribunal expressly mentioned oral penetration as an act that could constitute 
rape.
77
 The Furundžija definition is narrower and closer to the common law 
understanding of rape than the Akayesu definition. The definition is 
practically delimited to male perpetrators and digital penetration is not 
included. ICTY also concluded that force or coercion was an element of 
rape.
78
 
 
In the Kunarac case, ICTY expanded the definition of rape. The Tribunal 
accepted the Furundžija definition but found it necessary to clarify and 
expand the definition in paragraph (ii) of the Furundžija definition. The 
Tribunal considered the Furundžija definition to be narrower than 
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international law required in this aspect. The Furundžija definition did not 
include non-consensual or non-voluntary sexual penetration of the victim.
79
  
 
Similar to the Furundžija case, the Tribunal examined different legal 
systems to find an accurate definition of rape. They found that the basic 
principle, common to the examined legal systems, was that serious 
violations of a person’s sexual autonomy were penalized. The tribunal 
defined violation of sexual autonomy as; any act that was not freely agreed 
to or which the victim did not participate in voluntarily.
80
  
 
The Tribunal stated that the actus reus of rape in international law was: “the 
sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by 
the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such 
sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this 
purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free 
will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.”81  
 
The tribunal also established that the mens rea of rape was the penetration 
of the victim with the knowledge that it occurred without consent. 
According to the ICTY, the mens rea of rape consists of two requirements; 
the perpetrator has to have general intent to the sexual act as well as 
knowledge of lack of consent.
82
 The relation between the Akayesu definition 
and the Kunarac definition appeared as unclear and it was not until the 
Gacumbitsi case in 2006 that the question was addressed properly. The 
ICTR Appeals Chamber adopted the Kunarac definition of rape and 
concluded that non-consent and knowledge thereof are elements of rape 
under international law.
83
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The work of the ad hoc Tribunals in these three cases has made it easier for 
the ICC to establish an accurate definition of rape in its statute.
84
 The ICC 
has defined the crime of rape in the Elements of Crimes and the definition is 
a combination between the definitions developed by the ad hoc Tribunals in 
Akayesu, Furundžija and Kunarac. According to ICC, rape is defined as 
followed: “The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct 
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim 
or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening 
of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. 
 
The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such 
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by 
taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed 
against a person incapable of giving genuine consent”85 
 
The ICC definition uses the term “force or coercion” instead of lack of 
consent, however, the terms has a broad area of application. The definition 
does not address the mens rea of the crime but in Article 30 in the ICC 
Statute it is stated that a person should be criminally responsible if the act 
was committed with intent and knowledge. This corresponds with the 
approach in the Kunarac case were there were two requirements for the 
mens rea of rape.
86
 
5.1 Consent  
The question of consent or non-consent as an element of the crime of rape is 
constantly debated. The subject has been examined by the ICTY and ICTR 
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in several cases.  In the Kunarac case, the Tribunal stated that proof of non-
consent is required to convict someone of rape under international law. 
ICTY did thus accentuate that non-consent can be interfered from 
background circumstances like an ongoing genocide or detention. Most 
cases brought before the ICTY are cases including charges of war crimes or 
crimes against humanity. In these cases, true consent is not possible because 
the crimes are almost universally committed under coercive 
circumstances.
87
 The Appeals Chamber also established that there was no 
requirement of resistance from the victim in international law. Neither is 
force per se an element of rape but force, or threat of force, constitutes clear 
evidence of non-consent.
88
 
 
In the Gacumbitsi case, the ICTR sought clarification around the question of 
non-consent. The Tribunal emanated from the definition established in the 
Kunarac case where non-consent was required for conviction. The ICTR 
decided that non-consent has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
However, it was enough to prove the existence of coercive circumstances 
where meaningful consent is not possible.  The Tribunal was free to 
consider all relevant evidence in its evaluation of the background 
circumstances.
89
 An important acknowledgement made by the ICC is that 
certain people are incapable of giving genuine consent. People may be 
incapable due to age, mental capacity or physical condition. This approach 
corresponds with the main part of the domestic legal systems.
90
 Rule 96 of 
the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence generally provides 
that consent cannot be used as a defence if coercive circumstances exist.
91
 
The Rule refers to some of the matters that negate consent. If a witness is 
subjected to a factor listed in Rule 96, genuine consent is not possible. This 
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was established in the Kunarac case. However, the Trail Chamber did make 
an ambiguous statement when declaring that “consent will be considered to 
be absent in those circumstances unless freely given”92 The Tribunal 
attempts to balance the rights of the victim with the rights of the accused 
and wishes to avoid to establish strict liability.
93
 
 
5.2 The legal discourse  
According to Ellis, some legal scholars want rape to constitute an individual 
crime. To put rape in the subsection of other crimes may lead to rape being 
viewed as a lesser crime or makes it less distinctive.
94
  Weiner believes that 
it is unnecessary to require proof of knowledge of non-consent in war crime 
tribunals as the circumstances are generally coercive. Weiner also discuss 
the possibility of strict liability in cases where the victim is a minor or 
mentally disabled.
95
 
 
One feminist with a different view is Karen Engle. She believes that going 
further may rather aggravate than improve women’s situation. Engle is 
critical towards the direction the ICTY took in the Kunarac case where the 
Tribunal presumed coercive circumstances during armed conflict. She 
considers this presumption being counterproductive since it makes 
consensual sexual relationships legally impossible under some 
circumstances. This denies that some Muslim women may have chosen to 
have sex with male Serbian soldiers during the war and strips women from 
their independence and sexual agency. It also picture women as powerless 
victims, which may affect women’s possibilities to use their powers to solve 
and prevent conflicts. Another problem with the presumption of non-
consent in armed conflict is that the definition of armed conflict would 
decide where genuine consent may be possible. Engle also criticizes the 
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ICTY due to the low number of women prosecuted, even though women 
clearly participated in the war. This may contribute to the maintenance of 
the picture of women as victims and men as perpetrators. To solely focus on 
rape may also deflect attention from other harms that women may have 
suffered during the war. Many women witnessed their family members 
being tortured or killed, was separated from their family or had their homes 
burned down and communities destroyed. Engle also points to the fact that 
many women may have suffered less because they were women. Men were 
often tortured, killed or detained. At the end of the war, women were also 
the first prisoners to be released.
96
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6 Conclusion  
The recognition of rape as weapon of war made by the ad hoc Tribunals 
have been significant for the attitude towards wartime rape. Rape has been 
classified as one of the most serious crimes of war and international courts 
and tribunals have made important advancements to end impunity for rape-
related offences during armed conflict. Several war criminals have been 
convicted for rape as a crime against humanity or genocide and the ICTY 
and ICTR have made it clear that rape was used as a weapon of war or 
genocide. However, there are still challenges left.  
 
The concept of rape as a weapon of war has been significant for the 
international recognition of wartime rape. However, I agree with Buss that 
the concept may work counterproductive as it may exclude some victims 
from the justice system. It may also draw attention from the individual act 
of rape since it focuses on the rapes in a broader context, which could have 
unintended consequences. I believe that the concept is important since it 
draws attention to the problem, but that courts and tribunals should use it 
carefully and consider its consequences.  
 
It is important to continue the academic discussions concerning the subject 
and to work interdisciplinary to solve the problem. The use of rape as a 
weapon of war is very complex and it is insufficient to examine the problem 
solely from a judicial perspective.  The intense discourse has contributed to 
important advancements and it is important to continue the discussions to 
reach a comprehensive understanding of the subject.  
 
The ad hoc Tribunals have developed a relatively uniform definition of rape 
under international law. The definition is close to the common law 
understanding of rape and requires proof of non-consent or coercive 
circumstances. The question of non-consent is constantly debated and legal 
scholars have different views on the subject. The definition of rape as non-
 28 
consensual sexual intercourse is equitable under international law and it is 
suitable for prosecuting rape as genocide or crimes against humanity. Thus, 
it is problematic and counterproductive to presume non-consent during 
times of conflict as the ad hoc Tribunals have done in some cases. I agree 
with Engle that the presumption of coercive circumstances may aggravate 
the situation for women, since it strips them from their sexual autonomy. If 
such presumptions are made, it is legally impossible for women to have 
consensual sexual relations with “enemy soldiers”.  This generalisation may 
also jeopardize the rule of law and the presumption of innocence. At the 
same time, it is important that the victim’s burden of proof is not 
unreasonably high. The balance between the two have to be made carefully.   
 
Thus, it is equitable to have a stricter liability for the perpetrators knowledge 
of non-consent when the victim is a minor or mentally disabled. The ICC 
has made an important recognition when stating that some people are 
incapable of giving genuine consent. 
 
It is important to not portray women as victims or treat them as powerless or 
broken. I believe that it is important to make women involved in the 
decision-making, in the legal system and in the peacekeeping. To give 
women more power instead of making them victims is an important key to 
prevent systematic use of rape in times of conflict. It is also important to 
prosecute war criminals with rape-related crimes to show that impunity for 
wartime rape is no longer the rule.  
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